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Abstract
A protocol with the potential of beating the existing distance records for con-
ventional quantum key distribution (QKD) systems is proposed. It borrows ideas
from quantum repeaters by using memories in the middle of the link, and that of
measurement-device-independent QKD, which only requires optical source
equipment at the userʼs end. For certain memories with short access times, our
scheme allows a higher repetition rate than that of quantum repeaters with
single-mode memories, thereby requiring lower coherence times. By accounting
for various sources of nonideality, such as memory decoherence, dark counts,
misalignment errors, and background noise, as well as timing issues with
memories, we develop a mathematical framework within which we can compare
QKD systems with and without memories. In particular, we show that with the
state-of-the-art technology for quantum memories, it is potentially possible to
devise memory-assisted QKD systems that, at certain distances of practical
interest, outperform current QKD implementations.
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1. Introduction
Despite all commercial [1] and experimental achievements in quantum key distribution (QKD)
[2–10], reaching arbitrarily long distances is still a remote objective. The fundamental solution
to this problem, i.e., quantum repeaters, has been known for over a decade. From early
proposals by Briegel et al [11] to the latest no-memory versions [12–14], quantum repeaters,
typically, rely on highly efﬁcient quantum gates comparable to what we may need for future
quantum computers. While the progress on that ground may take some time before such
systems become functional, another approach based on probabilistic gate operations was
proposed by Duan and co-workers [15], which could offer a simpler way of implementing
quantum repeaters for moderate distances of up to around 1000 km. The latter systems require
quantum memory (QM) modules with high coupling efﬁciencies to light and with coherence
times exceeding the transmission delays, which are yet to be achieved together. In this paper,
we propose a protocol that, although is not as scalable as quantum repeaters, for certain classes
of memories, relaxes, to some extent, the harsh requirements on memories’ coherence times,
thereby paving the way for the existing technologies to beat the highest distance records
achieved for no-memory QKD links [2]. The idea behind our protocol was presented in [16],
and independent work has also been reported in [17]. This work proposes additional practical
schemes and rigorously analyses them under realistic conditions.
Our protocol relies on concepts from quantum repeaters, on the one hand, and the recently
proposed measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD), on the other. The original MDI-
QKD [18] relies on sending encoded photons by the users to a middle site at which a Bell-state
measurement (BSM) is performed. One major practical advantage of MDI-QKD is that this
BSM can be done by an untrusted party, e.g., the service provider, which makes MDI-QKD
resilient to detector attacks, e.g., time-shift, remapping, and blinding attacks [19–26]. The
security is then guaranteed by the reverse EPR protocol [27]. Another practical advantage is that
this BSM does not need to be a perfect measurement, but even a partial imperfect BSM
implemented by linear optical elements can do the job. In our scheme, by using two QMs at the
middle site, we ﬁrst store the state of the transmitted photons in the memories, and perform the
required BSM, only when both memories are loaded. In that sense, our memory-assisted MDI-
QKD is similar to a single-node quantum repeater, except that there is no memories at the userʼs
end. This way, similar to quantum repeaters, we achieve a rate-versus-distance improvement as
compared to the MDI-QKD schemes proposed in [18, 28–30], or other conventional QKD
systems that do not use QMs.
There is an important distinction between our protocol and a conventional quantum
repeater system that relies on single-mode memories. In such a quantum repeater link, which
relies on initial entanglement distribution among neighbouring nodes, the repeat period for the
protocol is mainly dictated by the transmission delay for the shortest segment of the repeater
system [31, 32]. In our scheme, however, the repeat period is constrained by the writing time,
including the time needed for the herald/veriﬁcation process, into memories. This implies that
using sufﬁciently fast memories, i.e., with short writing times, one can run our scheme at a
faster rate than that of a quantum repeater, thereby achieving higher key generation rates, as
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compared to conventional QKD links, and at lower coherence times, as compared to
probabilistic repeater systems. This increase in clock rate is what our proposal shares with the
recently proposed third generation of quantum repeaters, which use quantum error correction
codes to compensate for loss and errors, thus also being able to speed up the clock rate to local
processing times [12]. The need for long coherence times remains one of the key challenges in
implementing the ﬁrst generations of quantum repeaters before the latest no-memory quantum
repeater proposals can be implemented.
The above two beneﬁts would offer a midterm solution to the problem of long-distance
QKD. While our scheme is not scalable the same way that quantum repeaters are, it possibly
allows us to use the existing technology for QMs to improve the performance of QKD systems.
In the absence of fully operational quantum repeater systems, our setup can ﬁll the gap between
theory and practice and will become one of the ﬁrst applications of realistic QMs in quantum
communications.
It is worth mentioning that the setups we propose here are compatible with different
generations of hybrid quantum-classical (HQC) networks [33]. In such systems, home users are
not only able to use broadband data services, but they can also use quantum services such as
QKD. MDI-QKD offers a user-friendly approach to the access part of such networks as the end
users only require source equipment. Whereas, in the ﬁrst generation of HQC networks, the
service provider may only facilitate routing services for quantum applications, in the future
generations, probabilistic, deterministic, and eventually no-memory quantum repeaters
constitute the quantum core of the network. In each of these cases, our setups are extensible
and compatible with forthcoming technologies for HQC networks.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we describe our proposed
schemes and the modelling used for each component therein. Section 3 presents our key rate
analysis, followed by some numerical results in section 4. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2. System description
Our scheme relies on ‘loading’ QMs with certain, unknown, states of light. This loading process
needs to be heralding, that is, by the end of it, we should learn about its success. Within our
scheme, two types of memories can be employed, which we refer to by directly versus
indirectly heralding QMs. Some QMs can operate in both ways, while some others are more apt
to one than the other. By directly heralding memories we refer to the class of memories to which
we can directly transfer the state of a photon and we can verify—without revealing or
demolishing the quantum state—whether this writing process has been successful. An example
of such memories is a trapped atom in an optical cavity [34]. In the case of indirectly heralding
memories, a direct writing-veriﬁcation scheme may not exist. Instead, we assume that we can
entangle a photonic state with the state of such QMs [15, 35–40], and later, by doing a
measurement on the photon, we can effectively achieve a heralded writing into the memory.
These two approaches of writing cover most relevant practical examples to our scheme.
The scheme for directly heralding memories works as follows [16, 17]; see ﬁgure 1(a). The
two communicating parties, Alice and Bob, send BB84 encoded pulses [41], by either single-
photon or weak laser sources, towards QM units located in the middle of the link. Each QM
stores a photon in a possibly probabilistic, but heralding, way. Once both memories are loaded,
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we retrieve their states and perform a BSM on the corresponding photons. A successful BSM
indicates some form of correlation between the transmitted bits by Alice and Bob.
We can easily extend the above idea to the case of indirectly heralding memories. An
additional BSM, on each side, along with an entangling process between photons and QMs, can
replace the veriﬁcation process needed for directly heralding memories. In this case, see
ﬁgure 1(b), a successful BSM between the transmitted photon by the users and the one
entangled with the QM, would effectively herald a successful loading process, that is, the state
of the QM is correlated with the quantum state sent by the users.
In order to entangle a QM with a photon, one can think of two standard ways. One
approach would be to generate a pair of entangled photons, e.g., by using spontaneous
parametric down-converters [42, 43], and then store one of the photons in the memory and use
the other one for interference with the incoming photon sent by the user. While this approach is
not fully heralding (because we cannot be sure of the absorption of the locally generated photon
by the memory), it is still a viable option for highly efﬁcient writing procedures. Another
approach to entangle a photon with a memory, which this paper is mainly concerned with, is to
start from the memory and generate a photon entangled with the memory by driving certain
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Figure 1. (a) Measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD)
with directly heralding quantum memories. Alice and Bob use the efﬁcient BB84
protocol to encode and send pulses to their respective quantum memory (QM) in the
middle of the link. At each round, each QM attempts to store the incoming pulse. Once
they are both loaded, we retrieve the QMs’ states and perform a BSM on the resulting
photons. (b) MDI-QKD with indirectly heralding quantum memories. At each round, an
entangling process is applied to each QM, which would generate a photon entangled, in
polarization, with the QM. These photons interfere at the BSM modules next to the
QMs with incoming pulses from the encoders. As soon as one of these BSMs succeeds,
we stop the entangling process on the corresponding QM, and wait until both QMs are
ready for the middle BSM operation. In this case, QMs are not required to be heralding;
a trigger event is declared by the success of the BSM located between the QM and the
respective encoder. (c) The original MDI-QKD protocol [18]. (d) One possible energy-
level conﬁguration for a QM suitable for polarization encoding.
transitions in the memory [15, 40]. With entangling times as short as 300 ps reported in the
literature [44], high repetition rates are potentially achievable for indirectly heralding memories.
In either approach, it is possible to have multiple-excitation effects, which can cause errors
in our setup. In this paper, for readability reasons, we make the simplifying assumption of
having only single excitations in the memories, and address the multiple excitation effect in a
separate publication [45]. Furthermore, here we only consider the polarization entanglement.
The extension to other types of entanglement is straightforward and will be dealt with in
forthcoming publications.
Under all above assumptions, suppose once we entangle the memory A with a single
photon P, the joint state of the two is given by
+⎡⎣ ⎤⎦s H s V12 , (2.1)H A P V A P
where | 〉H P and | 〉V P, respectively, represent horizontally and vertically polarized single photons,
and | 〉sH A and | 〉sV A are the corresponding memory states; see ﬁgure 1(d). In equation (2.1), the
conditional state of the photon, knowing the memory state, has the same form as in BB84. Each
leg of ﬁgure 1(b), from the user end to the respective QM, is then similar to an asymmetric setup
of the original MDI-QKD scheme as depicted in ﬁgure 1(c). The working of the system in
ﬁgure 1(b) will then follow that of the original MDI-QKD. We will use this similarity in our
analysis of the system in ﬁgure 1(b).
The main advantage of our scheme as compared to the original MDI-QKD, in ﬁgure 1(c),
is its higher resilience to channel loss and dark count. In the no-memory MDI-QKD, both
pulses, sent by Alice and Bob, should survive the path loss before a BSM can be performed.
The key generation rate then scales with the loss in the entire channel. In our scheme, each pulse
still needs to survive the path loss over half of the link, but this can happen in different rounds
for the signal sent by Alice as compared to that of Bob. We therefore achieve the quantum
repeater beneﬁt in that the key generation rate, in the symmetric case, scales with the loss over
half of the total distance. Moreover, in the case of directly heralding memories, our scheme is
almost immune against dark counts [17]. This is because the measurement efﬁciency in the
BSM module is typically a few orders of magnitude higher than that of dark count rates. Dark
counts will then only sightly add to the error rate. In our scheme, memory decoherence errors
play a major role as we will explain in this and the following sections.
In the following, we describe the protocol and its components in more detail.
2.1. Protocol
In our protocol, Alice and Bob, at a rate RS, send BB84 encoded pulses to the middle station
(dashed boxes in ﬁgure 1). At the QMs, for each incoming pulse, we either apply a loading
process by which we can store the state of the photons into memories and verify it, or use the
indirectly heralding scheme of ﬁgure 1(b). Once successful for a particular QM, we stop the
loading procedure on that QM, and wait until both memories are loaded, at which point, a BSM
is performed on the QMs. The BSM results are sent back to Alice and Bob, and the above
procedure is being repeated until a sufﬁcient number of raw key bits is obtained. The rest of the
protocol is the same as that of MDI-QKD. Sifting and postprocessing will be performed on the
raw key to obtain a secret key. In this paper, we neglect the ﬁnite-size-key effects in our
analysis [29].
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2.2. Component modeling
In this section, we model each component of ﬁgure 1 including sources and encoders, the
channel, QMs, and the BSM module.
2.2.1. Sources and encoders. We consider two types of sources: ideal single-photon sources
and phase-randomized weak laser pulses. The latter will be used in the decoy-state [46] version
of the protocol. Each source, at both Aliceʼs and Bobʼs sides, generates pulses at a rate RS. Each
pulse is polarization encoded in either the rectilinear (Z) or diagonal (X) basis. In the case of
ideal single photons, we, correspondingly, send states | 〉H and | 〉V in the Z basis, and
| |〉 + 〉H V( )/ 2 and | |〉 − 〉H V( )/ 2 in the X basis. In each basis, the two employed states,
respectively, represent bits 1 and 0. In the case of the decoy-state protocol, the single-photon
states are replaced with weak phase-randomized coherent states of the same polarization. Here,
we use the efﬁcient version of BB84 encoding, where the Z basis is used much more frequently
than the X basis [47]. The pulse duration is denoted by τp and it is chosen in accordance with the
requirements of the memory system in use.
There are several sources of nonideality one may be concerned with at the encoder box.
For instance, in [48], one major source of error is in not generating fully orthogonal states in
each basis. Note that secure exchange of keys may still be possible, although at a possibly
reduced rate, by using even uncharacterized sources [49]. Another possible issue would be in
having multiple-photon components if one uses parametric down-converters to generate single
photons [50, 51]. Although all these issues, among others, are important in the overall
performance of the system, here we would rather focus on the memory side of the system,
which is newly introduced, and deal with the details of source imperfections, and their effects
on the secret key generation rate in a separate publication [45].
2.2.2. Channels. The distance between Alice (Bob) and the respective QM is denoted by LA
L( )B . The total distance between Alice and Bob is denoted by = +L L LA B. The transmission
coefﬁcient for a channel with length l is given by
η ≡ −l l L( ) exp ( / ), (2.2)
ch att
where Latt is the attenuation length of the channel (roughly, 22 km for 0.2 dB per km of loss).
The channel is considered to have a background rate of γ
BG
per polarization mode, which
results in an average γ τ=p 2 pBG BG background photons per pulse. This can stem from stray light
or crosstalk from other channels, especially if classical signals are multiplexed with quantum
ones in a network setup [5, 6, 52–54].
We also consider setup misalignment in our analysis. We assume certain polarization
maintenance schemes are in place for the Aliceʼs and Bobʼs channels, so that the reference
frames at the sources and memories are, on average, the same. We, nevertheless, consider a
setup misalignment error probability edK , for =K A B, , to represent misalignment errors in each
channel.
2.2.3. Quantum memories. We use the following assumptions and terminologies for the
employed QMs. This list covers most relevant parameters in an experimental setup relying on
polarization encoding, whether the QM is operated in the directly or indirectly heralding mode.
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• In the case of a successful loading, each QM in ﬁgure 1 ideally stores a polarization qubit
corresponding to the polarization of the incoming pulse. We assume that such a squashing
operation occurs [55, 56] even if at the input of the QM there is a nonqubit state, e.g., a
phase-randomized coherent state. That is, if, for instance, two photons with horizontal
polarizations are at the input of the memory, the QM would only store the polarization
information, and ignores the photon-number information. In practice, the loading
efﬁciency would be a function of input photon numbers, but, for simplicity, here we
neglect this dependence. This is in line with our single-excitation assumption we have
adopted in this paper. One suitable energy level structure for such a memory is the double-
Λ conﬁguration in ﬁgure 1(d), with a common ground state and two other metastable states
corresponding to two orthogonal polarizations. The excited states can then facilitate Raman
transitions from the ground state to each of the metastable states, using known optical
transition techniques [57, 58], in response to the input polarization state.
We assume that each QM only stores one spatio-temporal mode of light. Our protocol can
be extended to incorporate multimode QMs [59–62] or multiple QMs [31], in which case a
linear improvement in the rate is expected. In this work, we focus on the case of a single
logical memory per user and leave extensions to future work.
• For directly heralding memories, we denote the QMʼs writing efﬁciency by η
w
. The writing
efﬁciency is the probability to store a qubit and herald success conditioned on having a
single-photon at the QMʼs input. Note that η
w
also includes the chance of failure for our
veriﬁcation process. For indirectly heralding memories, we introduce an entangling
efﬁciency, η
ent
, which is the probability of success for entangling a photon with our QM.
• We denote the QMʼs reading efﬁciency by η
r
. That is the probability to retrieve a single
photon out of the QM conditioned on a successful loading in the past. The reading
efﬁciency is expected to decay over a time period t as η η= −t t T( ) exp [ / ]
r r0 1
, where T1 is
the memory amplitude decay time and η
r0
is the reading efﬁciency right after loading. In
our example of a double-Λ-level memory of ﬁgure 1(d), such a decay corresponds to the
transition form one of the metastable states | 〉sH or | 〉sV to the ground state | 〉g , in which case,
no photon will be retrieved from the memory.
• We denote the QMʼs writing time by τw. For directly heralding memories, it is the time
difference between the time that a pulse arrives (beginning of the pulse) at the QM and the
time that a successful/unsuccessful loading is declared. This is practically the fastest repeat
period one can run our protocol. In the case of indirectly heralding memories, τw includes
the time for the entangling process as well as that of the side BSM operation. Accounting
for such timing parameters is essential in enabling us to have a fair comparison between
memory-assisted and no-memory QKD systems.
One must note that in a practical setup there will be time periods, e.g., for synchronization
purposes or memory refreshing, over which no raw key is exchanged. The total number of
key bits exchanged over a period of time must therefore exclude such periods once the total
key generation rate is calculated. In our work, we neglect all these overhead times, with the
understanding that one can easily modify our ﬁnal result by considering the percentage of
the time spent on such processes within a speciﬁc practical setup.
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• We denote the QMʼs reading time by τr. It is the time difference between the time that the
retrieval process is applied until a pulse (end of the pulse) is out.
• We denote the QMʼs coherence (dephasing) time by T2. For an initial state ρ (0) of the QM
at time zero, its state at a later time t is given by [31]
ρ ρ ρ= + −t p t p t Z Z( ) ( ) (0) [1 ( )] (0) , (2.3)
where = + −p t t T( ) [1 exp ( / )]/22 . Note that dephasing would only occur if we are in a
superposition of Z eigenstates, e.g., the eigenstates of X. The above model of decoherence is
expected to have more relevance in some practical cases of interest [31, 34, 40] than the
model used in [17], in which the memory state switches suddenly from an intact one to a fully
randomized version after a certain time. We discuss the implications of each model in our
numerical result section. It is, however, beyond the scope of this paper to fully model every
possible decoherence mechanisms in QMs. Speciﬁc adjustments are needed if one uses a
memory that is not properly modelled by our T1 and T2 time constants.
2.2.4. BSM module. Figure 2 shows the schematic of the BSM module used in our analysis.
This module enables an incomplete BSM over photonic states. In order to use this module, in
our scheme, we ﬁrst need to read out the QMs and convert their qubit states into polarization-
encoded photons. The BSM will then be successful if exactly two detectors click, one H-
labelled and one V-labelled. Depending on which detectors have clicked and what basis is in
use, Alice and Bob can identify what bits they ideally share [28].
We assume the BSM module is symmetric. We lump detector quantum efﬁciencies with
other possible sources of loss in the BSM module and denote it by η
d
for each detector. We also
assume that each detector has a dark count rate of γ
dc
, which results in a probability γ τ=p pdc dc of
having a dark count per pulse. The implicit assumption here is that the retrieved and the writing
photons have the same pulse width. Finally, we assume that there is no additional misalignment
error in the BSM module.
3. Key rate analysis
In this section, we ﬁnd the secret key generation rate for our proposed schemes in ﬁgures 1(a)
and (b). The common assumption in our predicting the relevant observed parameters in a QKD
experiment is that we work under the normal mode of operation, where there is no eavesdropper
present, and we are only affected by the imperfections of the system, behind which an
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Figure 2. Bell-state measurement module for polarization states.
eavesdropper can in principle hide. We later compare our results with two conventional QKD
schemes, namely, BB84, summarized in appendix A, and the original MDI-QKD in ﬁgure 1(c),
summarized in appendix B, that use no memories. In all cases, we consider both single-photon
and decoy-state sources. In all forthcoming sections, f denotes the inefﬁciency of the error
correction scheme, i.e., the ratio between the actual cost of error correction and its minimum
value obtained by the Shannonʼs theorem, assumed to be constant, and we denote the binary
entropy function as = − − − −h p p p p p( ) log ( ) (1 ) log (1 )
2 2
, for ⩽ ⩽p0 1.
3.1. Key rate for single-photon sources
With ideal single-photon sources, the secret key generation rate in the setups of ﬁgures 1(a) and
(b) is lower bounded by [63]
= − −⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) ( )R R Y h e fh e1 , (3.1)S X ZQM 11QM 11;QM 11;QM
where efﬁcient BB84 encoding is employed [47]. In the above equation, e X11;
QM and e Z11;
QM,
respectively, represent the quantum bit error rate (QBER) between Alice and Bob in the X and Z
basis, when single photons are used, and Y11
QM represents the probability that both memories are
loaded with single photons of the same basis and the middle BSM is successful.
To obtain the individual terms in equation (3.1), we can decompose the protocol into two
parts: the memory loading step and the measurement step, once both memories are loaded. The
ﬁrst step is a probabilistic problem with two geometric random variables, NA and NB,
corresponding, respectively, to the number of attempts until we load Alice and Bobʼs memories
with single photons. The number of rounds that it takes to load both memories is then
N Nmax { , }A B . Once both memories are loaded, the rest of the protocol is similar to that of
original MDI-QKD in terms of rate analysis: the QMs replace the sources in ﬁgure 1(c) and the
total transmission-detection efﬁciency is replaced by the reading-measurement efﬁciency in the
BSM module. We can therefore use many of the relationships obtained for the original MDI-
QKD, summarized in appendix B, for the memory-assisted versions of ﬁgure 1.
For ﬁnite values of T1, the reading efﬁciency for the Aliceʼs QM could be different from
that of Bob. In fact, we can assume that, once both memories are loaded, one of the memories
(late) will be read immediately, while the other (early) | − |N NA B rounds after its successful
loading. The effective measurement efﬁciency for the leg K, =K A B, , corresponding to the
path originating from memory K in the BSM module will then be given by
η
η η η
η η=
≡
= −⎪
⎪⎧⎨
⎩
K
t N N T K
, if memory is late
( ), if memory is early.
(3.2)
mK
m r d
d r A B
0
With the above setting, and considering the required time for reading from the QMs, we
obtain
η η
η η
η η
η η
=
+
=
+
′
Y
N N
Y
N N
Y
1
( , )
E{ ( , )}
1
( , )
( , ), (3.3)
L A B r
mA mB
L A B r
m m
11
QM
1 1
11
1 1
11
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where Y11 is the corresponding yield term, given by equation (B.4), for the MDI-QKD protocol
and =N N NE{max ( , )}L A B is given by equation (C.3). Here, ·E{ } represents the expectation
value operator with respect to NA and NB, and η η η=′m d r, where η η= −| − |N N T TE{exp ( / )}r r A B0 1
can be obtained from equation (C.4). In equation (3.3), Nr, represents the extra rounds lost due
to the nonzero reading times of QMs, once they are both loaded, and is given by
τ τ τ τ τ= + − > ⩽⎡⎢⎢
⎤
⎥⎥N T T1, , 0, , (3.4)r
r w
r w w
where =T R1/ S is the repetition period. The condition τ ⩽ Tw is a matter of practicality as
sending photons faster than they can be stored is of no beneﬁt. The fastest possible rate is then
obtained at τ=T w.
In the case of directly heralding memories of ﬁgure 1(a), we have
η η η= − − =η−( )( )L e K A B1 1 , , , (3.5)K w K p1 ch w BG
as the probabilities of successful loading of Alice and Bobʼs QMs with single-photon sources
(or background noise). In the case of indirectly heralding memories of ﬁgure 1(b), following our
discussion in (2) about the equivalence of each leg of ﬁgure 1(b) to an asymmetric MDI-QKD
system, we have
η η η η η= =( )( )Y L K A B, , , , (3.6)K d K d1 11 ch ent
where the above terms must be calculated at an effective dark count rate of γ γ η+ /2
ddc BG
.
We remark that, although obtained from different methods, the analysis in [17] also ﬁnds
similar expressions for the yield term. In [17], the analysis is only concerned with the symmetric
setup, and some of the parameters considered in our work take their ideal values. It can be
veriﬁed, however, that in the special case of τ = Tw , τ = 0r , γ = 0BG , =L LA B, η = 1w , and
→ ∞T1 , for directly heralding memories, equation (3.3) reduces to the same result obtained in
[17]. By accounting for additional relevant parameters, our analysis offers a better match to
realistic experimental scenarios.
Similarly, the error terms are given by
η η η η
η η η η
η η η η
η η η η
=
=
=
≈
′
′
{ }
{ }
( )
( )
( )
( )
{ }
e e e
e e
e e e
e e
E , , ( , )
, , ( , ) ,
E , , ( , )
, , E ( , ) , (3.7)
Z Z mA mB dZ A B
Z m m dZ A B
X X mA mB dX A B
X m m dX A B
11;
QM
11;
QM
1 1
11;
QM
1 1
11;
QM
11;
QM
1 1
11;
QM
1 1
where, e Z11; and e X11; , given by equation (B.4), are the corresponding error terms for the original
MDI-QKD. In addition to the typical sources of error, such as loss and dark count, the above
expressions are functions of misalignment parameters. This misalignment could be a statistical
error in the polarization stability of our setup, modelled by edA and edB, or an effective
misalignment because of memory dephasing [64] and/or background photons. Putting all these
effects together, as we have done in appendix D, we obtain
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η η η η η η
η η η η
= −
+ − =
( )
( )
e e e
e e S X Z
( , ) ( , ) 1 ( , )
( , ) 1 ( , ) , , , (3.8)
dS A B dS
A
A B dS
B
A B
dS
B
A B dS
A
A B
QM ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
where edS
A( ) and edS
B( ), respectively, represent the misalignment probabilities for Aliceʼs and Bobʼs
memories, for basis =S X Z, , at loading probabilities η
A
and η
B
and are given by equations
(D.2) and (D.5). The above equation accounts for the fact that if the state of both memories are
ﬂipped, Alice and Bob will still share identical key bits. We assume that the BSM module is
balanced and does not have any setup misalignment.
Note that in equation (3.8), because of no dephasing errors for the Z eigenstates, edZ
QM is
independent of NA and NB, whereas edX
QM is a function of them. The approximation in equation
(3.7) assumes η η η η≈e eE{ } E{ }E{ }dX mA mB dX mA mB
QM QM , which is valid when ≫T T1 2, to give a more
readable ﬁnal result.
Equation (3.8) can also be used in the case of indirectly heralding QMs as explained in
appendix D. The main idea is to use the analogy of each leg in ﬁgure 1(b) with the original
MDI-QKD in ﬁgure 1(c).
3.2. Key rate for decoy states
Suppose Alice and Bob use a decoy-state scheme with average photon numbers μ and ν,
respectively, for the two main signal intensities, and inﬁnitely many auxiliary decoy states. The
secret key generation rate, in the limit of inﬁnitely long key, is then given by
= − − μν μν
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )( ) ( )R R Q h e fQ h E1 , (3.9)S X Z ZQM 11QM 11;QM ;QM ;QM
where
η η
η η=
+
′μν
μ ν( )
( )Q
N N
Y
1
,
, (3.10)Z
L A B r
m m;
QM
11
is the rate at which both memories are loaded, by Alice (Bob) sending a coherent state in the Z
basis with μ (ν) average number of photons, and a successful BSM is achieved. In the case of
directly heralding memories,
η η= − = −μ
η η μ η
μ
η η ν η− − − −e e1 and 1 (3.11)( ) ( )
A
L p
B
L pA w w B w wch BG ch BG
are the probabilities for successful loading of Alice and Bobʼs QMs with coherent-state sources.
Similarly,
η η η η= ′μν μ ν( )( )E e e, , , (3.12)Z Z m m dZ A B;QM 11; QM
is the QBER in the Z basis, and
η η
η η
μν= μν
μ ν
μ ν− −Q Q e (3.13)Z
A B
A B
11
QM
;
QM 1 1
is the contribution of single-photon states in the gain term of equation (3.10).
Similar to the treatment in the previous subsection, one can ﬁnd or approximate the above
terms in the case of indirectly heralding memories as well. For the sake of brevity, we leave this
extension to the reader.
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Apart from all additional parameters considered in our model as compared to [17], our
treatment of the decoy-state QKD is different from that of [17] in the way that QMs are
modelled. In our work, we assume QMs store qubits, which while is not necessarily an exact
model, it often serves a good ﬁrst-order approximation to the reality. In [17], however, QMs are
assumed to be able to store number states. This assumption cannot be applied to certain QMs,
such as single trapped atoms or ions, that can only store one photon.
3.3. Storage time
To get some insight into the working of our system, in this section, we simulate the achievable
rates assuming = =L L L /2A B . The average number of trials to load both memories from
equation (C.3) is then given by [65]
η η η
η η η
η= −
−
≈ · ≪N ( , ) 3 2
(2 )
3
2
1
, for 1, (3.14)L
where η is the probability of successfully loading a QM at distance L /2, approximately, given
by η − L Lexp ( ( /2)/ )
QM att
, where η η=
wQM
for directly heralding memories, and η η η=
dQM ent
2 for
indirectly heralding QMs. Similarly, the average required storage time, from equation (C.5), is
given by
η
η η η
η= − = −
−
≈ ≪{ }T N N T T TE 2(1 )
(2 )
, for 1, (3.15)st A B
which is similar to the result reported in [17].
The secret key generation rate in equations (3.1) and (3.9) is proportional to the pulse
generation rate =R T1/S at the encoder. To maximize RS, we choose τ=T w, throughout this
section and next, resulting in τ η≈T /st w . Figure 3 compares Tst with the required storage time in
multi-memory probabilistic quantum repeaters [31], L c/ , where c is the speed of light in the
channel. It can be seen that our scheme offers lower required coherence times until a certain
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Figure 3. Average required storage time, Tst, versus distance, in our scheme, for
different repetition rates τ1/ w. As compared to that of a probabilistic quantum repeater,
labelled by L c/ , where = × −c 2 10 m s8 1 is the speed of light in optical ﬁbre, our
scheme requires lower coherence times up to a certain distance. The crossover distance
at τ μ= 1 sw is over 300 km and at τ = 1 nsw is nearly 700 km. In all curves,
η η η= = = 1
w d ent
and =p 0
BG
.
distance. With fast memories of shorter than 10 ns of access time, this crossover distance could
be longer than 500 km. With such memories, the required coherence time at 300 km is roughly
1 μs, or lower, as compared to over 1 ms for probabilistic quantum repeaters.
It is worth mentioning that the possible advantage of requiring low coherence times is only
achievable for systems with nesting level one, i.e., with one stage of entanglement swapping.
Unlike quantum repeaters, our protocol, in terms of its timing, is not scalable to higher nesting
levels. Nevertheless, even with only one entanglement swapping stage, our protocol can
outperform conventional QKD schemes in terms of rate-versus-distance behaviour, and, more
importantly, this can possibly be achieved with existing technology for QMs. We explore this
and other aspects of our scheme in the next section.
4. Numerical results
In this section, we study the impact of various parameters on the secret key generation rate of
our scheme. All results have been obtained assuming the symmetric setup described in (3.3),
τ = Tw , f = 1.16, = × −c 2 10 m s8 1, and 0.2 dB per km of loss in the channel. We also compare
our scheme with the efﬁcient BB84 and MDI-QKD protocols, whose secret key generation rates
are, respectively, summarized in appendices A and B.
4.1. Coherence time
In this section, we discuss the effects of memory dephasing on the secret key generation rate. As
mentioned before, while our scheme in ﬁgure 1(a) is particularly resilient to dark count errors, it
still suffers from memory errors. Figure 4 demonstrates the secret key generation rate per pulse
at different coherence times for the scheme of ﬁgure 1(a). A ﬁnite coherence time is the only
source of nonideality considered in this ﬁgure. Since, in our model, the dephasing process only
affects the diagonal basis, =e 0Z11;QM at all distances; hence ∝ −R h e1 ( )XQM 11;QM remains always
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Figure 4. Secret key generation rate per pulse for the heralded scheme of ﬁgure 1(a) for
different values of T T/2 using single-photon sources. The dashed line represents the
ideal efﬁcient BB84 case. Unless explicitly mentioned, all other parameters assume
their ideal values: → ∞T1 , η η η= = = 1w r d0 , γ γ= = 0BG dc , = =e e 0dA dB , and τ = 0r .
positive. The rate is initially proportional to − L Lexp ( ( /2)/ )att , and with low values of e X11;QM for
short distances, our scheme beats the BB84 case depicted by the dashed line. Note that, because
of the partial BSM in ﬁgure 2, the initial key rate at L = 0 for our scheme is lower than that of
BB84. At large distances, however, the dephasing process becomes signiﬁcant and results in
e X11;
QM approaching 1/2; see the inset. Subsequently, RQM decays with a faster slope and at some
point becomes lower than what one can achieve with an ideal BB84 system. The window
between the two crossing points on each curve is the range where our scheme, can, in principle,
beat a noise-free BB84 system. This window is larger for QMs with longer coherence times.
In [17], authors look at the minimum required coherence time to achieve nonzero key rates,
assuming =e eX Z11;QM 11;QM within their model of decoherence. Although the models used for
decoherence in our work and [17] are different, e X11;
QM has a similar behaviour in both cases. In our
case, however, the transition from 0 to 1/2 is smoother than that of [17]. This is expected as the
model in [17] is an abrupt good–bad model for the memory. A consequence of this difference is
that the minimum required coherence time is then higher in our case, which highlights the
importance of the more accurate model we have used for decoherence. The comparison in ﬁgure 4
assumes that the source rate RS is the same for both the BB84 protocol and our scheme. In our
scheme, however, RS depends on the writing time of the memories. Figure 5 shows the secret key
generation rate for the scheme of ﬁgure 1(a) at a ﬁxed value of =T T/ 10002 , but for several values
of τ= =T R1/w S. The BB84 system is run at a ﬁxed rate of 1 GHz. Again, we assume that the only
source of nonideality is memory dephasing. It can be seen that slow memories with writing times
of 100 ns, or higher, can hardly compete with an ideal BB84 system. The two orders of magnitude
lost because of the lower repetition rate cannot be compensated within the ﬁrst 300 km. It is still
possible to beat the BB84 case, at long distances, if memories have higher coherence times.
4.2. Realistic examples
It is interesting to see if any of the existing technologies for quantum devices can be employed
in our scheme to beat conventional QKD systems. Figure 6 makes such a comparison between
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Figure 5. Secret key generation rate for different values of τw at =T T/ 10002 using
single-photon sources. The dashed line represents the ideal efﬁcient BB84 case at
= −R 1 G pulse sS 1. Unless explicitly mentioned, all other parameters assume their ideal
values: → ∞T1 , η η η= = = 1w r d0 , γ γ= = 0BG dc , = =e e 0dA dB , and τ = 0r .
BB84, MDI-QKD, and memory-assisted MDI-QKD for particular experimental parameters. We
have chosen our QM parameters based on the two lessons learned from ﬁgures 4 and 5: the QM
needs to have a high bandwidth-storage product ( τT / w2 ) on the order of 1000 or higher, and, it
also needs to be fast, with writing times on the order of nanoseconds. Both these criteria are met
for the QM used in [44], which particularly offers fast reading and writing with 300 ps long
pulses at a storage time of around 4 μs. The employed memory in this experiment is an atomic
ensemble, which ﬁts our indirectly heralding scheme of ﬁgure 1(b). We should, however, be
careful with multiple excitations in this case, which are not considered in our model. We
therefore assume that, by driving this memory with short pulses, one can ideally generate the
jointly entangled state in equation (2.1) between the memory and a photon [39], where, in this
case, | 〉sH and | 〉sV are, respectively, the corresponding symmetric collective excited states to
horizontal and vertical polarizations [15, 37]. By keeping the entangling efﬁciency low at
η = 0.05
ent
, here, we try to keep the effect of multiple excitations in such memories low
[35, 66, 64]; further analysis is, however, required to fully account for such effects [45]. We
also assume that =T T2 1 and use the state-of-the-art single-photon detectors with η = 0.93d at
γ = 1
dc
count per second and 150 ps of time resolution [67] for all systems.
We consider two sets of parameter values for our employed QM in ﬁgure 6. In the ﬁrst set,
corresponding to the curve labelled A on the ﬁgure, we use the same numerical values as
reported in [44], that is, η = 0.3
r0
, μ=T 4 s1 , and τ τ τ= = = 300w r p ps. We, however, assume
that τ=R 1/S w, which is much faster than the repetition rate used in [44]. In the curve labeled B,
we improve the performance by assuming η = 0.73
r0
, which is what another group has obtained
for a similar type of memory [39], and μ= =T T 100 s1 2 , which is attainable by improving
magnetic shielding [68]. It can be seen that, whereas the current QM employed in [44] is short
of beating either of no-memory systems, our slightly boosted system, in curve B, outperforms
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Figure 6. Secret key generation rate for single-photon BB84 (dotted), MDI-QKD
(dashed), and our indirectly heralding scheme of ﬁgure 1(b) (solid) at practical
parameter values. In all curves, η = 0.93
d
, γ = 1
dc
/s, γ = 0
BG
, and = =e e 0.005dA dB . For
BB84 and MDI-QKD, = −R 3.3 G pulse sS 1, similar to τ=R 1/S w, in our scheme. For
our scheme, we have used some of the experimental parameters reported in [44]. For the
curve labelled A, η = 0.05
ent
, η = 0.3
r0
, μ= =T T 4 s1 2 , and τ τ τ= = = 300w r p ps. It is
assumed that there is no multiple excitations in the QMs. For the curve labelled B,
everything is the same except that η = 0.73
r0
and μ= =T T 100 s1 2 .
both systems at over roughly 200 km. The cut-off distance in curve B is about 400 km, which is
mainly because of memory decoherence, and it can be improved by using memories with longer
coherence times. This implies that with slightly improving some experimental parameters, we
would be able to employ realistic QMs to improve the performance of practical quantum
communication setups. We remark that the example QM chosen in ﬁgure 6 is not necessarily
the only option, and improved versions of other types of memories can potentially offer the
same performance [40, 61, 69–73].
What we have proposed here is an initial step toward improving the performance of QKD
systems by using QMs. In particular, we have shown how technologically close we are to
beating a direct, no-memory, QKD link in terms of the achievable rate at certain long distances.
Our scheme is not, however, scalable to arbitrarily long distances. For that matter, full quantum
repeaters would eventually be needed. A possible roadmap for the development of such systems
would pass through probabilistic, and then deterministic, and eventually no-memory versions of
quantum repeaters [12–14]. It is hard to make a fair comparison between all these and our
scheme, as the required resources in each case are different. Some studies have nevertheless
compared different repeater schemes under certain assumptions [64, 74]. It is only the future, in
the end, that proves which system, and at what price, can be implemented over the course of
time.
5. Conclusions
By combining ideas from quantum repeaters and MDI-QKD, we proposed a QKD scheme that
relied on QMs. While offering the same rate-versus-distance improvement that quantum
repeaters promise, the coherence-time requirements for the QMs employed in our scheme could
be less stringent than that of a general single-mode probabilistic quantum repeater system. That
would provide a window of opportunity for building realistic QKD systems that beat
conventional no-memory QKD schemes by only relying on existing technologies for QMs. In
our work, we showed that how close some experimental setups would be in achieving this
objective. Our protocol acts as a middle step on the roadmap to long-distance quantum
communication systems.
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Appendix A. BB84 key rate analysis
In this appendix we summarize the secret key generation rate for the efﬁcient BB84 protocol
[47] shown in ﬁgure A1. In ﬁgure A1, Alice is the transmitter sending pulses in either the
rectilinear or diagonal basis and Bob is the receiver, which decodes the message. They
communicate through an optical channel of distance L.
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With a clock rate of RS, the secret key generation rate is lower bounded by
= − −R R Y h e fh e[1 ( ) ( )], (A.1)SBB84 1 1 1
in the single-photon case, and
= − − μ μ
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )( )R R Q h e fQ h E1 ( ) , (A.2)SBB84 1 1
in the (inﬁnitely many) decoy-state case, where μ is the average number of photons for signal
states, which is dominantly used. In equation (A.1), Y1 is the yield of single photons, or the
probability that Bob gets a click on his measurement devices assuming that Alice has sent
exactly one photon, and is given by
η= + = − − −Y Y Y p1 (1 )(1 ) , (A.3)C E1 dc
2
where η η η= L( )
dch
, and
η η η η= − + − = − − +Y p p Y p p(1 /2)( (1 ) ) and [(1 )(1 /2) /2] (A.4)C Edc dc dc dc
correspond, respectively, to the terms that, in the absence of misalignment, result in identical
(Correct) versus nonidentical (Error) bits shared by Alice and Bob. The QBER, e1, which is the
same for both bases, is given by
η
= + − = − − −
= − − −
e Y e Y e Y e Y e e Y Y
e Y e e p
(1 ) ( )( )
( ) (1 ), (A.5)
d C d E d C E
d
1 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 dc
where =e 1/20 and = +e e ed dA dB is the total misalignment probability for the channel.
Similarly, in equation (A.2),
μ=
= + = − −
= − − +
= − + −
μ
μ
ημ
ημ ημ
ημ ημ
−
−
− −
− −
Q Y e
Q Q Q e p
Q p e e p
Q p e p e
,
1 (1 ) ,
(1 /2)(1 ),
[ (1 /2) (1 )/2], (A.6)
C E
C
E
1 1
dc
2
dc dc
dc dc
are the corresponding gain terms [46], and
= − − − − =μ μ μ ημ−E Q e Q e e e p e( )(1 )(1 ), 1/2, (A.7)d0 0 dc 0
gives the QBER.
Appendix B. MDI-QKD key rate analysis
The secret key generation rate for the MDI-QKD scheme of ﬁgure 1(c) is lower bounded by
[28]
= − −− ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦R R Y h e fh e1 ( ) ( ) , (B.1)S X ZMDI QKD 11 11; 11;
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Figure A1. The setup for the BB84 protocol.
in the single-photon case, and
= − − μν μν−
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )( )R R Q h e fQ h E1 ( ) , (B.2)S X Z ZMDI QKD 11 11; ; ;
in the decoy-state case, where μ (ν) is the average number of photons for signal states sent by
Alice (Bob). Here,Q11 is the probability of generating one photon by the sources and obtaining a
successful BSM and is given by
η η μν η η= μ ν− −Q e Y( , ) ( , ) (B.3)
a b a b11 11
where η η η= L( )
a A dch
and η η η= L( )
b B dch
are transmission coefﬁcients of each leg in ﬁgure 1(c),
and [28]
η η
η η
η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
η η η η η η η η
= − + + − + − −
= − − −
= − − − −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥Y p p p
e e Y e Y e e p
e e Y e Y e e p p
( , ) (1 )
2
(2 2 3 ) 4(1 )(1 ) ,
( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )(1 ) /2,
( , , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )(1 ) (1 2 ) /2 (B.4)
a b
a b
a b a b a b
X a b d a b a b d a b
Z a b d a b a b d a b
11 dc
2
dc dc
2
11; 11 0 11 0 dc
2
11; 11 0 11 0 dc
2
dc
with ed being the total misalignment probability. In the scheme of ﬁgure 1(c),
= − + −e e e e e(1 ) (1 )d dA dB dB dA . Similarly, using the results obtained in [28], we have
= +
= + −
′ ′
′ ′
μν
μν μν
Q Q Q
E Q e Q e Q(1 ) , (B.5)
Z C E
Z Z d C d E
;
; ;
where
= − − − − −
= − − −
′
′
μ η μ η μ
μ μ
− ′ − −
− ′ − ′
⎡⎣ ⎤⎦ ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦Q p e p e p e
Q p p e I x p e
2(1 ) 1 (1 ) 1 (1 )
2 (1 ) [ (2 ) (1 ) ]. (B.6)
C
E
dc
2 /2
dc
/2
dc
/2
dc dc
2 /2
0 dc
/2
a a b b
In above equations, I x( )0 is the modiﬁed Bessel function of the ﬁrst kind and
η μη ν=x /2, (B.7)
a b
= − η μ η ν− +y p e(1 ) , (B.8)
dc
1
4
( )
a b
μ η μ η ν′ = + . (B.9)
a b
Appendix C. Loading process
The loading process in the setups of ﬁgures 1(a) and (b) are probabilistic ones, with two
geometric random variables NA and NB playing the major role. Suppose the success probability
for each loading attempt corresponding to these random variables is, respectively, given by η
A
and η
B
. Then, we obtain the following probability distribution for | − |N NA B :
η η− = = − + − >⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( ) ( )( )N N k P kPr 1 1 , 0, (C.1)A B A
k
B
k
0
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where
η η
η η η η
= = =
+ −
P N NPr( ) . (C.2)A B
A B
A B A B
0
Using the above expressions, we then obtain
η η
η η
η η η η η
η η
η η η η η η η
=
= − + +
=
−
+ −
+
−
+ −
+ +
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥
{ }
N N N
N N N N
( , ) E{max ( , )}
1
2
E
1
2
(1 )
( )
(1 )
( )
1 1
. (C.3)
L A B A B
A B A B
A B
B A B A B
B A
A A B A B A B
Moreover,
δ
η η
− − =
− −
+
− −
−δ δ− −
⎡
⎣⎢
⎤
⎦⎥{ }( )N N P e eE exp
1
1 (1 )
1
1 (1 )
1 (C.4)A B
A B
0
and the average storage time, Tst, is given by
η η
η η η η η
η η
η η η η η
= − =
−
+ −
+
−
+ −{ }T N N T
T T
E
(1 )
( )
(1 )
( )
. (C.5)st A B
A B
B A B A B
B A
A A B A B
Finally, we can show that
η
η η
⩾ =
− − −
= − <N N N NPr{ }
1 (1 )(1 )
1 Pr{ } (C.6)A B
B
A B
A B
and
∑δ δ
η η η
η η η
≡ = = −
=
−
− − − − −
δ
δ
< = <
∞
−
−
S N n N n n n
e
e
( ) Pr{ , } exp [( ) ]
(1 )
[1 (1 ) ][1 (1 )(1 )]
. (C.7)
A B n n A a B b a b
A B B
B A B
1 a b
Appendix D. Misalignment parameters
In this appendix, we obtain the misalignment probability for each of the setups in ﬁgures 1(a)
and (b). Let us ﬁrst consider the directly heralding memory case in the Z basis and assume
loading probabilities η
A
and η
B
for Aliceʼs and Bobʼs memories. Suppose the legitimate state is
| |〉〈s sH H . Assuming setup misalignment probabilities edK , =K A B, , for leg K of ﬁgure 1(a), in
the absence of background counts, the stored state in memory K will become
| | | |ρ = − 〉〈 + 〉〈e s s e s s(1 )d dK H H dK V V0 . Now, including the background counts, the memory state
will become
ρ ρ= − +
+⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e e s s s s1
2
, (D.1)
dZ
K
d
K H H V V
BG
( )
0 BG
( )
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where = η
− η−e K eBG
( ) 1 wp
K
BG
, =K A B, , is the probability that our memory has been loaded by a
background (unpolarized) photon conditioned on a successful loading. The total misalignment
probability in the Z basis for the Aliceʼs and Bobʼs memory is then given by
= − + =( )e e e e K A B1 /2, , , for directly heralding QMs. (D.2)dZK dK K K( ) BG( ) BG( )
Now, letʼs assume the legitimate state, in the X basis, is | |〉〈+ +s s , where | | |〉 = 〉 ± 〉±s s s( )/ 2H V .
Right after a successful loading, the state of the memory is then given by
ρ ρ= − +
+′⎡⎣ ⎤⎦e e s s s s(0) 1
2
(D.3)
dX
K
d
K H H V V
BG
( )
0 BG
( )
where | | | |ρ = − 〉〈 + 〉〈′ + + − −e s s e s s(1 )d dK dK0 . If memory A is the late memory, i.e., if ⩾N NA B,
then there will be no dephasing errors, in which case, =e edXA dZA( ) ( ). If it is the early memory,
however, the dephasing operation in equation (2.3) will act on ρ (0)
dX
to give us
ρ ρ= − +
+′⎡⎣ ⎤⎦t e t e s s s s( ) 1 ( )
2
, (D.4)
dX
K
d
K H H V V
BG
( )
0 BG
( )
where
| | | |ρ = − + − 〉〈 + + − − 〉〈′ + + − −t e p t e p t s s e p t e p t s s( ) [(1 ) ( ) (1 ( ))] [ ( ) (1 )(1 ( ))]d dK dK dK dK0 .
The misalignment probability is then given by
β= +e e e , (D.5)dXK dZK A
K( ) ( )
deph
( )
where β = − −e e(1 2 )(1 )
K dK
K
BG
( ) , =K A B, , and
=
⩾
− − − <⎪
⎪⎧⎨
⎩ ⎡⎣ ⎤⎦( )
e
N N
N N T T N N
0
(1/2) 1 exp /
, (D.6)A
A B
A B A B
deph
( )
2
where NA and NB are geometric random variables with success probabilities ηA and ηB. By
averaging over these variables, we obtain
β= + { }{ }e e eE E , (D.7)dXA dZA A A( ) ( ) deph( )
where
= < − <{ }e N N S T TE [Pr{ } ( / )]/2, (D.8)A A B A Bdeph( ) 2
which can be obtained from equations (C.6) and (C.7). One can obtain similar expressions for
edX
B( ) by swapping A and B in equations (D.6)–(D.8).
To calculate eE{ }dX
QM from equation (3.8), the ﬁnal remaining term is given by
β β= + +{ } { }{ }e e e e e e e eE E E , (D.9)dXA dXB dZA dZB A A dZB B B dZA( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) deph( ) ( ) deph( ) ( )
where we used the fact that =e e 0A Bdeph( ) deph( ) , as one of the two terms is always zero regardless of
the values of NA and NB.
In the case of indirectly heralding QMs, we assume that each erroneous click on the side
BSMs will effectively result in a ﬂip to the corresponding QM state, and can also be modeled as
misalignment. This assumption is valid at low distances where majority of errors are caused by
the setup misalignment. We then obtain
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η η η η= =e e L e( ( ), , ), K A, B, (D.10)dZK Z d K d dK
( )
11; ch ent
for indirectly heralding QMs, where e Z11; can be calculated from equation (B.4) at an equivalent
dark count rate of γ η γ+ /2
ddc BG
. At long distances, most errors originate from dark counts or
background photons, whose effective misalignment effect will approach half of e Z11; in the
above equation. As a conservative assumption, we use the expression in equation (D.10) for all
distances.
All other terms in equations (3.7) and (3.8) can be obtained following the same expressions
in eqations (D.5)–(D.9) at β = − e1 2
K dZ
K( ), for =K A B, , and using equation (D.10) for edZK( ).
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